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We study the joint impact of gender and marital status on financial decisions. First, we test the 
hypothesis that marriage represents - in a portfolio framework - a sort of safe asset, and that this 
effect is stronger for women. Controlling for a number of observable characteristics, we show that 
single women have a lower propensity to invest in risky assets than married females and males. 
Second, we show that the differential behavior of single women evolves over time, reflecting the 
increasing incidence of divorce and the expansion of female labor market participation. In 
particular,   towards the end of our sample period, we observe a reduction in the gap between 
women with different family status, which can be attributed to the gradual erosion of the perception 
of  marriage as a sort of safe asset. Our results therefore suggest that the differential behavior of 
single vs. married women can be explained by  the evolution of gender roles in society, even after 
controlling for differential risk attitudes. Our empirical investigation is based on a dataset drawn 
from the 1989-2006 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the joint impact of gender and marital status on portfolio 
decisions, as well as its evolution. The relevance of gender and marital status has been established 
for a variety of related issues, ranging from wealth accumulation and savings behavior to political 
choices and preferences toward the size of government. Nevertheless, only a few studies consider 
marital status and gender jointly when analyzing their implications for portfolio decisions. In the 
present paper, we focus on these implications, and on how they are shaped by the transformation of  
family structure and gender roles in society. 
 
In more detail, we test the hypothesis that marriage represents - in a broad portfolio framework - a 
sort of safe asset, and that this effect is stronger for women. Moreover, we test the hypothesis of 
marriage as a safe asset along a time dimension, taking into account the increased incidence of 
divorce, with the consequent breakdown of the traditional family, and the parallel expansion of 
female labor force participation, which has redefined the role of women in society. 
 
The idea of marriage as a source of financial security, particularly for women, is based on the fact  
that women tend to have a more insecure societal role. Compare the asset position of a single  
woman with that of a married one. To simplify, focus on two component of wealths: financial assets 
and the present value of labor earnings. By getting married, a woman becomes entitled to at least a 
portion of the gender gap in labor earnings. When no risks are associated with the married status 
and with the size of the gender earnings gap, or when such risks are uncorrelated with the risks on 
financial returns, marriage can indeed be viewed as a sort of safe asset that decreases the overall 
variance of a married woman’s asset position. As an implication, the propensity to invest in risky 
financial assets should be lower for a single woman. 
 
However, it has to be reckoned that, in recent times, the perception of being married as a risk free 
status must have changed in the face of the observed evolution of family structure, with the 
progressive dissolution of the traditional family and the increasing diffusion of divorce. Likewise, 
the increasing participation of women to the labor market must have caused a parallel gradual 
reduction in the gender earnings gap. Therefore, both developments must have eroded women’s 
view of marriage as a valuable and safe asset. As an implication, the marital status gap in the 
propensity to invest in risky assets should be on the decline.  
 
On the basis of the above considerations, we test the hypothesis that the portfolio decisions of single 
women should reflect a lower propensity to invest in risky assets, if compared to married females 
and males. Moreover, we argue that the differential behavior of single women does not simply 
reflect a higher, exogenously-given, and invariant degree of risk aversion, but is largely driven by 
the  evolution of gender and family roles in society. Consequently, the marital status differential in 
portfolio choices should not be time invariant, but should react to indicators such as the increased 
diffusion of divorce and the expanded participation of women into the labor market.  
 
Our empirical analysis tests the above predictions on a dataset drawn from the 1989-2006 Bank of 
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Italy provides an ideal setting for our investigation. 
On the one hand, the last decade has witnessed significant developments, along both the gender and 
the marital status dimensions, in the financial behavior of Italian households: the number of females 
in charge of financial decisions has registered a substantial increase, while figures for marital status 
have displayed a parallel increase in single decision makers. On the other hand, the Italian society 
has experienced a particularly fast evolution, with a pronounced transformation of its family 
structure: while divorce became legal in Italy only in 1974, divorce figures have boosted in the last 
ten years. At the same time, the post-war period has witnessed an almost uninterrupted expansion of   3
women’s participation in the labor market, which has profoundly altered the role of women in the 
Italian society. As a consequence, our sample can fully capture the evolving role of gender and 
marital status for financial choices.  
 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a probit model for the decision to participate, i.e., for the 
probability of investing in risky assets. For this model, we first run a set of pooled regressions 
including standard explanatory variables such as household income and wealth, family size, number 
of children, and age and education of the household head. To these regressors, we add a set of 
dummies jointly capturing the household head gender and marital status, to gauge how the 
participation decision of single women differs from that of the other groups, i.e., married women, 
single men and married men. The reason we focus on single women is two-fold: first,  the decisions 
of married individuals, of either gender, may be influenced by the spouse and, second, we expect 
women to be more directly affected than men by the evolution of family and society. Regression 
results show that the gender-marital status dummies all exert a positive impact, which indicates that 
single women are the least inclined to participate in risky investment. Married women come next, 
while married men score at the top. This holds true even controlling for time and for the divorce 
rate and the female lavor force participation rate at the regional level, where the latter two variables 
should capture the potential impact of background factors related to the structure of family and 
society. These preliminary results confirm, as from previous studies, that female and single 
investors are less inclined to take risk. However, they do not reveal a link between the specific 
behavior of single women, the structure of the Italian family and that of the Italian labor market. 
Therefore, to further investigate whether the impact of gender and marital status for portfolio 
decisions has evolved throughout the period under consideration in connection with the evolution of 
family and society, we reestimate the above regressions including a set of interactions between the 
time dummies and the married female dummy. Regression results show that indeed the differential 
behavior of married vs. single women has significantly evolved over time, displaying an inverted-U 
shape: the difference tends to be lower at the beginning of the sample, peaks during the intermediate 
years, and declines afterwards. We argue that these trends, rather than by exogenous variations in 
risk attitudes, are largely driven by the evolution of gender roles in society. In other words, the  
increased diffusion of divorce on the one hand, and the expanded participation of women into the 
labor market on the other, are among the determinants of the facts we document. We base our claim 
on the following further evidence: when, in the augmented regressions including time interactions, 
we also control for the divorce rate and the female labor force participation rate, the significance of 
the time interactions vanishes, suggesting that the evolution of family and society can explain a 
significant portion of the differential behavior of single women.  
 
In particular, the increase in labor participation is likely to have acted, at the initial stage, in the 
direction of widening the participation of married women to financial decision making. It is the 
lagged, cumulative impact of this force that presumably can explain why, at some point at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the difference between married and single women starts to emerge: before 
that time, the vast majority of female financial decision makers were in fact single. As women, and 
particularly married women, had by that time entered the labor market, economic independence 
began to translate into financial independence. Later on, after the 1998-2000 peak is reached, 
another, new and opposing force comes into the picture. Gradually, the previous decade had in fact 
shaken the foundations of the Italian family, with an increase in the number of divorces which must 
have gradually eroded the perception of marriage as a safe asset, thus reducing the differential risk 
behavior of women with different family status.  
 
The evolving role of society and family structure for financial decisions which emerges from our 
pooled regressions is confirmed by a set of repeated cross sections, one for each wave. The repeated 
cross section analysis allows, for the most recent waves of 2004 and 2006, further investigation   4
regarding the role of  risk aversion. In principle, it could be the case that exogenous differences in 
risk aversion can fully explain the gender and marital status gap in making financial decisions. 
However, cross section regressions which include a measure of risk aversion confirm the 
explanatory power of our gender-status dummies. Further robustness checks include variants of the 
pooled regressions involving the Guiso and Jappelli (2002) alternative definition of risky assets, 
wealth quantiles, a finer classification of marital status, an employed household heads subsample, 
and a dummy controlling for the employment status of the household head.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 
presents background information on the evolution of marriage, divorce and female labor force 
participation in Italy. Section 4 describes our dataset. Section 5 presents our empirical findings and 
Section 6 tests their robustness. Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for future research. The 
Data Appendix collects information about the data we employed. The Robustness Appendix 
contains the tables discussed in Section 6. 
  
 
2.  Related literature 
 
Our results can be related to three separate streams of the literature.  First, within the financial 
literature, the link between gender, risk aversion and a variety of economic decisions has been 
assessed in various contexts. Examples are Hinz et al. (1997), Schubert et al. (1999), Croson and 
Gneezy (2004), Dohmen et al. (2005), Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007), and Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2008). This mainly empirical research generally reveals for women a higher degree of risk aversion 
and a lower propensity to undertake risky projects. Besides, a parallel strand has focused on the 
impact of marital status on financial choices (see, among others, Waite and Gallagher, 2000 and 
Lupton and Smith, 2003). Nevertheless, only a few studies consider marital status and gender 
jointly when analysing their implications on financial decisions. Noteworthy exceptions are the 
following. Sundén and Surette (1998) point to the interaction between gender and marital status in 
determining the allocation of assets in retirement savings plans, with single women exhibiting a 
more cautious attitude. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single women exhibit relatively 
more risk aversion in financial decision making than single men. Barber and Odean (2001) report 
that the differences in portfolio turnover and net return performance are larger between the accounts 
of single men and single women than between the accounts of married men and married women. 
Schmidt and Sevak (2006) document large differences in American households' wealth 
accumulation by gender and marital status. Zissimopoulos et al. (2008) show that the large 
differences in wealth accumulation between single and married women cannot be explained by 
observable characteristics. While the above studies focus on the United States, for the Italian case 
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) gauge the relevance of gender and marital status, as separate dimensions, 
for portfolio decisions, while for Denmark Christiansen et al. (2006) show that single females have 
a lower propensity to invest in risky assets.  
 
Second, the macroeconomic literature has studied the importance of the process that determines 
changes in marital status for macroeconomic aggregates. For the U.S. experience of the past twenty-
five years, Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) study the quantitative importance of the process that 
determines changes in family composition for consumption and savings decisions and find that 
marital events affect men and women differently. Over this period the share of single households 
has grown dramatically, introducing marital risk among the determinants of saving. Rendall (2007) 
endogenizes the rise in divorce rates and the fall in marriage rates, by assuming that these 
demographic changes are driven by the shrinking gender wage gap and the relaxation of divorce 
laws. Love (2007) studies the impact of changes in marital status on household savings and   5
portfolio decisions and shows that divorce affects men and women differently, with men 
reallocating toward stocks and women shifting their portfolios toward safer assets. 
 
Third, a political-economic literature has studied the discrepancy between men's and women's 
preferences for political parties and government programs, again focusing on the role of societal 
modernization and the associated increase in marital instability: the diffusion of divorce and the 
decline in marriage have been found responsible for the observed changes in the political gender 
gap and the size of government, by shifting women's choices toward more leftist political parties 
and a higher level of welfare expenditures. Edlund and Pande (2002) trace the evolution of the 
political gender gap during the last three decades in the United States to the decline in marriage and 
show a strong correlation between state divorce prevalence and the political gender gap, with higher 
divorce prevalence reducing support for the Democrats among men but not women.
1 In their 
analysis of government size in United States during the 1870-1940 period, Lott and Kenny (1999) 
show that women suffrage has a positive effect on government size and conjecture that the gender 
gap can be attributed to women's financial insecurity and societal role, so that government size is in 
turn affected by family breakdown and increasing divorce rates. 
 
 
3. Background  
 
3.1. Marriage, divorce and female labor supply in Italy 
 
The decline of marriage and the increasing diffusion of divorce represent a common tendency 
among industrialized countries. Within this broader picture, the Italian society has experienced a 
particularly fast evolution, with a pronounced transformation of its family structure. The standard 
reference for the history of divorce is Phillips (1988), who studies the way divorce laws have been 
transformed since the nineteenth century. Up to the 1960s, divorce was not even legal and Italy was 
still exhibiting a traditional family structure, if compared to other Western countries. The 
introduction of divorce legislation in 1970 was followed by a failed attempt to abolish it, with the 
support of the Roman Catholic church. In 1974 opponents of divorce called a referendum to outlaw 
it, but they did not achieve their goal. The original form of the legislation was very conservative, 
and allowed couples to obtain a divorce only five years after their legal separation. Still, this legal 
innovation confirmed an emerging trend toward societal modernization and an ongoing evolution of 
traditional gender roles. During the first few years after its introduction, divorce figures reflected 
the existing backlog, and decreased immediately afterwards, as reflected in Chart 1. The beginning 
of the 1980s marked a moderate increase of the crude divorce rate. In 1987 the legislation went 
through an important reform which reduced the waiting period to three years, thus provoking a 
sudden jump of the divorce rate. However, this increase was subsequently absorbed with a 
temporary decline, even though the divorce rate never returns to its pre-reform level. In fact, since 
1995, a quick increase has occurred. Chart 2 reports the number of marriages, divorces and 
separations during our sample period, i.e., between 1989 and 2006, and shows that divorces and 
separations have increased by 46.7% and 93.1%, respectively, while marriages have recorded an 
opposite trend (-23%). As a result, over our sample, separated/divorced households have more than 
doubled. Even discounting the impact of the 1987 reform, the data clearly show a structural break, 
which can be dated at around the beginning of the 1990s and marks the end of the Italian 
traditionally stable family structure. These trends document a significant increase in marital 
instability, with a consequent increase in the risks of marriage breakdown.  
 
                                                 
1 Friedberg (1998) also explores the impact of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates, while Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2007) study the influence of divorce reforms on family formation decisions. 
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Chart 1. Crude divorce and female employment rates in Italy, 1958-2006 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations based on data from Istat and OECD.  The female employment rate 
(left scale)  is computed as female employment over female working age population (OECD), 
while the crude divorce rate (right scale) is  defined as the number of divorces every 1000 
individuals (OECD data up to 1990, Istat thereafter).  
 
Chart 2. Marriages, separations and divorces in Italy, 1989–2006 
 
Note: The data source is Istat, “Marriage, Separations and Divorces in Italy”, various editions. 
Marriages on the left scale, Separations and Divorces on the right scale.    
 
The role of women in society is directly influenced by women’s position in the labor market. As 
illustrated in Chart 1, the Italian female employment rate is 0.28 in 1950. This is a bit higher than in 
the other Mediterranean countries, and below the US, the UK and France (see, e.g., Fernandez and 
Fogli, 2007, for an international comparison of female labor force participation rates). During the 
next decades, however, the Italian figures witness a steady increase, with the female employment 
rate reaching 0.47 in 2006. With reference to our sample period, however, we actually observe a 
decline in the early 1990s, which can be linked to the 1992 recession.    7
 
To sum up, Italy combines, on the one hand, the legacy of a very traditional view of gender roles 
within the family and, on the other, a very fast evolution away from this legacy. This suggests that 
marriage may indeed has worked, at least at the beginning of the sample, as a safe asset, but also 
that this role might have become less pronounced over time as marriage becomes riskier. Moreover,  
the post-war period witnesses an almost uninterrupted expansion of women’s role in the labor 
market. These developments may well be interconnected with the evolution of family structure 
previously outlined. Indeed Chart 1 shows a positive correlation between divorce and female 
employment, a pattern which is common to most developed countries.
2  
 
3.2. Financial markets and household portfolios in Italy 
 
In the 1989-2006 period covered by our investigation, household portfolios have witnessed a 
significant evolution in Italy, as described by Guiso and Jappelli (2002) and Brunetti and Torricelli 
(2007). Participation in the equity market has increased sharply, with a parallel decline of 
transaction accounts and government bonds. These trends can be explained by a number of factors, 
including the evolution of the yield differential between stock and bonds, the development of 
mutual funds, subsequent waves of privatization, reforms of the social security system, the lifting of 
capital controls in 1989, and the pre-2000 stock market boom. More specifically, the last decade has 
also experienced significant developments along the gender and the marital status dimensions: 
women as financial decision makers have registered a substantial increase, while figures for marital 
status display a parallel increase of the number of single decision makers. Chart 3 reports from each 
SHIW wave available between 1989 and 2006 the weighted percentage of households by marital 
status of the the household financial head. By household financial head we mean the most 
responsible for the financial and economic choices of the household (see also the following Data 
section and footnote 5). Chart 4 reports the weighted percentage of households by marital status and 
gender.  
 
Chart 3. Household financial heads by marital status, 1989-2006 
 
Note: The chart reports the weighted percentage of households by marital status of the 
household financial head as from each SHIW wave available between 1989 and 2006. 
Columns refer to the left scale, while the line refers to the right scale.  
                                                 
2 A notable exception is represented by the US, which have experienced a reversal since the mid-1980s, with a 
continuing rise in female labor force participation and a fall of divorce rates. See Neeman et al. (2008) for a discussion 
and a survey of the related literature.   8
 
Chart 4. Household financial heads by gender and marital status, 1989-2006  
 
Note: The chart reports the weighted percentage of households by gender and marital 
status of the  household financial head as from each SHIW wave available between 
1989 and 2006. 
 
The data clearly show that during the period under consideration  the structure of the average Italian 
family has sensibly changed. Along the marital status dimension, figures display a decline of the 
proportion of married individuals that take financial decisions and a parallel increase in singles, i.e., 
never married, separated/divorced and widowed (from 25% in 1989 to 37% in 2006). As for gender, 
women who are household financial head register a substantial increase (from 18% in 1989 to 37% 
in 2006). In more detail, in 1989 married males represent 74% of the household heads, single males 
8%, married women 1%, and single women 17%. By 2006, the share of married males has declined 
to 51%, the share of single males has increased to 12%, the share of married females has reached 
12%, with a spectacular jump especially around 2000, and the share of single females has reached 
25%. Therefore, by the end of the sample, we observe a dramatic change in the composition of 
household financial heads along the gender and status dimension.  
 
Turning to the financial decisions of the household financial head that enter our sample, a 
comparison of the rate of participation in risky financial assets in 1989 and 2006 is illustrated in 
Chart 5. Overall, participation has sensibly increased between 1989 and 2006. It peaks between 
2000 and 2002, reflecting the stock market boom and it subsequent crash.  Moreover, the chart 
reveals a considerable gender and marital status gap in participation.  Males generally participate 
more than females, both in 1989 and 2006, independently of their marital status. Likewise, 
independently of gender, married individuals participate more than non married in all waves except 
1989. For males, the gap between married and single is moderate in the initial waves and intensifies 
in recent ones with the increase in participation. For females, the difference between married and 
single is marked from the beginning of the sample, and tends to decline in the last two waves.  
 
   9
 
Chart 5. Participation rate by gender and marital status, 1989-2006 
 
Note: Percentage of households participating to the risky market by gender and 
marital status of the household financial head from each SHIW wave available 
between 1989 and 2006.   
 
To sum up, the stylized facts we document confirm the relevance of both gender and marital status 
for portfolio choices, and that these factors have had an evolving impact during the period under 
consideration. In other words, the transformation of the family structure, driven by the increase in 
divorce and the decline in marriage, and the increasing participation of women into the labor 
market, manifest themselves through their consequences for risk taking and hence for financial 
decisions.  
 
Additional information can be drawn from the composition of the average financial portfolio. A 
comparison between 1989 and 2006, illustrated in Chart 6, shows a general increase in the 
proportion of risky assets, which is explained by several factors including the reduced profitability 
of government bonds, the development of mutual funds and the lifting of capital controls. Chart 6 
also confirms that gender and family status both matter. In 1989 the average financial portfolio of 
females has a definitely safer profile than that of males, with almost 90% in totally safe assets and a 
negligible amount is in risky assets. Married individuals tend to hold riskier portfolios, within the 
general tendency to increased diversification over our  sample period. When  we combine the 
gender and marital status dimensions, we find that, both in 1989 and in 2006, single women show 
the highest proportion in safe assets and the lowest in risky assets. Again, these data do suggest that 
marriage may work as a safe asset, particularly for women.    10
  




       Note: Authors’ elaborations on data from the 1989 and 2006 SHIW.    
 
 
4. Data   
 
Our dataset spans over the period 1989 – 2006 and draws from the Historical Archive of the Bank 
of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (HA-SHIW)
 3, which specifically provides over 
that period nine waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006) and from Istat (the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics). The Bank of Italy Survey provides plenty of demographic 
information on each household 
4 and in this paper we have used the following: number of household 
components, number of children, as well as age, level of education, gender and marital status of the 
head of the household.
5 As for education, the survey provides a categorical variable assuming 
                                                 
3 For more details on the survey HA-SHIW see http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait.  
4 The SHIW basic sample unit is the household defined as “a group of people, linked by ties of blood, marriage or other 
relationships, sharing the same dwelling and pooling all or part of their incomes”. 
5 The HA-SHIW reports three different definitions for the head of the household, namely: (i) the “most responsible for 
the financial and economic choices of the household” (“declared” definition); (ii) the person who earns the highest   11
values between 1 and 6, whereby 1 is no education title and 6 is post-graduate title. As far as marital 
status is concerned, the survey distinguishes among married, never married, separated/divorced, and 
widowed. Since in what follows we are specifically interested in the implicit value of the asset 
marriage, we distinguish between married and non married heads of household, where the latter 
group includes those households whose head is never married, separated, divorced, or widowed.  
 
Beside these demographic information, the SHIW also provides economic information about the 
households, including the income, the net wealth (real and financial assets net of financial 
liabilities) as well as the amounts (expressed in Italian lira until 2000 and in Euro thereafter) 
invested in a variety of financial assets. Given the focus of this paper on risky assets as opposed to 
non-risky ones, we have first grouped financial assets into different classes according to their risk 
profiles.
6 Our risk classification is based on the joint consideration of credit risk and market risk. As 
for the former, we distinguish two different levels. Specifically, the “Lower” level is assigned to 
financial assets issued by both the domestic sovereign (i.e., the Italian government) and by banks, 
securities firms and cooperatives. The “Higher” level is associated to all the assets issued by the 
remaining agents, basically corporations. Foreign activities are treated separately as the amounts 
provided by the HA-SHIW are not distinguished by resident and non-residents issuers, so that a 
more precise credit-risk classification for these assets is not possible. As far as market risk is 
concerned, three main forms are considered, i.e.: exchange-rate risk, concerning the foreign 
activities only, interest-rate risk, associated with all bonds securities and price risk, associated to 
stocks and shareholdings. In addition, a fourth market-risk category, referred to as “mixed”, is 
created for those kinds of investments where bonds (interest-rate risk) and stocks (price risk) are 
mixed together (see Table 1). Six main financial-asset groups beside cash are thus identified 
7: 
 
1.  Deposits: lower credit risk and no market risk 
2.  Goverment Bonds: lower credit risk and interest-rate risk  
3.  Corporate Bonds: higher credit risk and interest-rate risk  
4.  Managed Investments: lower credit risk and mixed market-risk 
5.  Stocks: higher credit risk and price-risk  
6.  Foreign Assets: exchange-rate risk 
 
In order to single out risky assets, we make a further aggregation in three risk-categories (as 
highlighted in Table 1): “clearly safe”, “fairly safe” and “risky”, with two main differences with 
respect to the Guiso and Jappelli (2002) risk classification. First, we move long-term government 
bonds from the risky to the fairly safe category. As argued by Guiso and Jappelli (2002), “the large 
and increasing government debt leads investors to attach a non-zero probability of default even on 
short-term government bonds. But this has changed after the dramatic fiscal stabilization started in 
1996”. Based on this reduced risk-profile, the shift from risky to fairly safe assets appears 
reasonable. Second, while Guiso and Jappelli (2002) place life-insurances into the fairly safe 
                                                                                                                                                                  
income (“income” definition); and (iii) the reference point to establish the relationships among all members of the 
household (“Eurostat” definition). Here, the first definition is preferred. Nevertheless, the three definitions exibit a high 
degree of  overlapping: the “declared” corresponds to the “income” (“Eurostat”) head of the household in 80% (96%) of 
the cases.  
6  Since we focus on financial portfolios, we do not consider investment decisions in housing. However, housing enters 
our definition of wealth.  
7 The asset classification we present is sufficient to the scope of the present analysis, although from a financial 
viewpoint it is not precise and neglects some sources of risk (e.g., liquidity). A more rigorous classification would not 
be anyhow possible because of lack of information. As an example, the risk profiles of government bonds may be high 
or low depending, among other things, on their time-to-maturity. The survey however does not provide any information 
about the duration of these instruments, so that all government bonds have to be placed in the same risk-class. 
Nevertheless, this simplification seems consistent with the perceptions of the majority of households, which typically 
associate a comparable level of risk to all government bonds.   12
category and gather all the remaining managed investments in the risky one, here all forms of 
managed investments are classified as fairly safe. The choice of Guiso and Jappelli (2002) stemmed 
from the observation that “until 1995 […] most funds where in stocks”. However, they admit that 
“the availability of a large number of money market and balanced funds in the late ‘90s tends to 
blur our definition”. Hence, also considering the high diversification that typically characterises 
managed investments, we classify them as fairly safe. Since this paper focuses on the household 
decision to make a risky investment, we believe it is very important not to define the class “Risky” 
so as it contains only assets that are  surely so. The presence into this class of assets which might 
not have a definitely risky feature would blur the participation decision and essentially overestimate 
it.  Besides, the most recent waves of the SHIW, 2004 and 2006, provide information on household 
heads’ risk aversion, based on a subjective question in which the respondent is asked to indicate the 
characteristics of the preferred financial investments among the following: 1 = high risk of losing 
part or all the capital, high returns; 2 = reasonable risk losing part of the capital, good returns; 3 = 
low risk of losing part of the capital, reasonable returns; 4 = no risk for the capital, low returns. This 
question, which allows to rank individuals with respect to their risk aversion without having to 
assume a particular functional form for the utility function, is asked only to people with financial 
assets other than bank or postal current account (that is, about 35,05% of the sample) in 2004 and  
to all household financial heads in 2006. 
 
Table 1. Financial assets classification, by credit and market risk 
Market 
   
Credit 












CCT, BTP, CTZ 
and Others) 
Repo   








Higher    Bonds   
Stocks  
Shares in LLC 
Partnerships’ shares 
 
-         Foreign assets 
Note: Shaded cells indicate comparable risk-profiles: light grey denotes safer assets, more intense grey 
indicates fairly safe assets and dark grey gathers the risky ones.  
 
 
Some of the variables we use in our analysis are not provided by the HA-SHIW and hence are 
calculated based on data provided by Istat 
8: this is the case for the crude divorce rate, the crude 
separation rate, the female labor force participation (FLFP) rate and the female employment rate, all 
computed at the regional level. The crude divorce (separation) rate is the number of divorces 
(separations) in each region every 1000 region residents. The female labor force participation rate is 
obtained as the sum of women occupied and those actively looking for an occupation divided by the 
total female working-age population resident in the region, while the female employment rate is 
obtained as the ratio between the women occupied over the total female working-age (15-64) 
population in the region of residence. 
 
                                                 
8 Data are downloadable from http://www.istat.it/lavoro/.   13
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the variables included into the dataset,  both on the 
whole pooled sample and in each single wave considered.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Pooled 1989  1991 1993 1995 1998 2000  2002  2004 2006
0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 PARTICIPATION 
(0.29) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32)
0.37 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.35
PARTICIPATIONGJ  (0.48) (0.43) (0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
54.70 53.28 54.15 53.72 54.50 55.10 55.14 55.33 55.18 55.52 AGE 
(16.07) (15.70) (15.89) (15.90) (15.80) (15.99) (16.29) (16.27) (16.33) (16.21)
22.45 21.75 21.88 21.43 21.06 22.31 22.46 22.80 23.42 24.46 INCOME 
(18.90) (15.38) (14.41) (16.41) (17.02) (19.87) (18.16) (17.99) (21.68) (24.91)
154.84 95.94 112.63 131.40 251.29 140.31 146.66 150.89 164.82 191.32 WEALTH 
(298.23) (147.64) (157.13) (232.39) (404.41) (298.30) (283.64) (264.59) (281.96) (430.54)
2.73 2.90 2.89 2.90 2.84 2.72 2.69 2.65 2.54 2.54 FAMILY SIZE 
(1.33) (1.37) (1.36) (1.36) (1.34) (1.30) (1.30) (1.30) (1.29) (1.28)
0.93 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.01 0.93 0.89 0.87 0.79 0.80 CHILDREN 
(1.03) (1.08) (1.07) (1.08) (1.05) (1.02) (1.01) (1.00) (0.97) (0.98)
0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 EDU = 1 
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23)
0.31 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.24 EDU = 2 
(0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.43)
0.27 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 EDU = 3 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
0.26 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.32 EDU = 4 
(0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47)
0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 EDU = 5 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 EDU = 6 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
0.30 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.35 FEMALE 
(0.46) (0.40) (0.41) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
0.33 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.37 SINGLE 
(0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
0.59 0.72 0.71 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.48 0.52 MM 
(0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
0.08 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 MF 
(0.27) (0.11) (0.09) (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.31)
0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 SM 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33)
0.22 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.24 SF 
(0.42) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43)
6.16 5.34 4.87 4.23 4.79 5.98 6.70 7.38 7.70 7.80 DIVORCE 
(2.54) (2.21) (1.89) (1.64) (1.83) (2.20) (2.71) (2.73) (2.71) (1.14)
11.30 7.60 8.02 8.58 9.38 11.22 12.87  14.07  14.35 14.23 SEPARATION 
(4.43) (2.76) (2.84) (3.26) (3.20) (3.29) (4.32) (4.29) (4.00) (3.38)
0.35 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39 FLFP 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
0.30 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.35 FER 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
0.49      0.49 0.49 RISK AVERSION 
(0.50)      (0.50) (0.50)  14
Observations 71625 8274  8188 8089 8135 7147 8001  8011  8012 7768
Notes: PARTICIPATION and PARTICIPATIONGJ  are dummy variables assuming  value 1 if the household holds 
in its financial portfolio risky activities, according to the definitions adopted in this study and Guiso and Jappelli 
(2002), respectively. AGE is the age of the household financial head, INCOME and WEALTH are respectively the 
total income and net wealth of the households (expressed in € at 1995 values for the pooled sample), FAMILY 
SIZE is the number of components of the household, CHILDREN is the number of children in the household, EDU 
is a categorical variable indicating the highest education title achieved, FEMALE, SINGLE, MM, MF, SM, SF 
are dummy variables assuming value 1 if the household financialhead is respectively female, non married (i.e. 
never married, separated, divorced or widowed), married male, married female, single male or single female. 
DIVORCE and SEPARATION are respectively the divorce and the separation rates in the region of residence, 
FLFP and FER represent the female labor force participation and the female employment rate, RISK AVERSION 
is a dummy variable with value 1 if the financial decisor is risk-averse. For additional details see data Appendix. 





To test our hypotheses, we estimate a probit model for the decision to partecipate, i.e., for the 
probability of investing in risky assets. For this model, we run a set of pooled regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. In order to provide a baseline against which 
we can compare subsequent findings, the first specification we select is given by: 
 
hkt kt kt t hkt hkt hkt hkt hkt A D SM MF MM X P ε β β τ β β β β β + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1      (1) 
 
where  hkt P is a binary variable with value 1 if household h in region k at time t holds any risky 
assets, 0 otherwise. The vector  hkt X  includes standard explanatory variables, i.e., household income 
and wealth (linear and quadratic terms), household characteristics (family size and number of 
children), and variables related to the household head (age, age square and education). The dummy 
variables MM, MF and SM jointly capture the household financial head gender and marital status 
and stand, respectively, for married males, married females and single males. In particular, MM is a 
dummy taking value 1 if for household h the household financial head is a married male and 0 
otherwise. The dummies MF and SM are analogously defined for married females and single males. 
This set of dummies is meant to gauge how gender and marital status jointly affect the participation 
decision, highlighting how the participation decision of single women differs from that of the other 
groups, i.e., married women, single men and married men. Each regression also includes a set of 
year dummies  t τ , one for each subsequent available wave, except 1989 which is our reference 
point. The variable  kt D is the divorce rate in region k at time t, while   kt A is  the female labor force 
participation rate in region k at time t . Finally,  hkt ε is the error term.  
 
Table 3 reports the results obtained using the pooled sample including 71.652 observations. In the 
most parsimonious specification presented in column 1, the propensity to invest in risky assets 
appears to increase with age, income, wealth, and education, with highly significant marginal 
effects for all regressors. Therefore, the impact of the standard determinants of participation is 
confirmed. The regression results also indicate that large households are less likely to invest in risky 
financial assets, while the number of children has a positive impact, possibly because this 
characteristic induces a longer time horizon and thus investment choices that are riskier and more 
rewarding over the long run. The time dummies indicate that the probability of choosing risky 
investments tends to increase over time, consistently with the observed evolution of capital markets 
in the sample period. In particular, across the different specifications, the time dummies display a 
significantly positive impact between 1998 and 2002, i.e., the years that witnessed a sharp increase   15
of participation in the equity market. Turning to the gender-marital status dummies, they all display 
positive marginal effects, which indicate that single women are the least inclined to participate in 
risky investment. Married women come next, while married men score at the top. In columns 2, 3, 
and 4, we add to the regression the divorce rate and the female labor force participation rate in the 
region of residence, first individually and then jointly, in order to capture the potential impact of 
background factors related to the structure of family and society: the effect of both regressors is 
significantly positive, but their inclusion does not alter the conclusions we reached for the impact of 
gender and marital status. In particular, the effect of MF is substantially unaltered. The positive 
impact of these regressors could be explained by their high correlation with the local level of 
income and financial development. More broadly, however, it also signals the fact that a society 
where family structure is less conservative and women are more emancipated tends to display a 
more optimistic attitude and thus a higher risk tolerance.  
 
 
Table 3. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006 
Variable 1  2  3  4 
AGE  0.0033 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0031 *** 0.0031  ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.0299 *** -0.0281 *** -0.0272 *** -0.0270  ***
INCOME  0.0027 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0021  ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.0053 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0040 *** -0.0039  ***
WEALTH  0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001  ***
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.000005 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.000005  ***
FAMILY SIZE  -0.0174 *** -0.0137 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0124  ***
CHILDREN  0.0052 **  0.0060 **  0.0066 *** 0.0066  ***
EDU=2  0.0634 *** 0.0505 *** 0.0459 *** 0.0443  ***
EDU=3  0.1112 *** 0.0925 *** 0.0900 *** 0.0869  ***
EDU=4  0.1715 *** 0.1506 *** 0.1489 *** 0.1452  ***
EDU=5  0.2156 *** 0.2008 *** 0.2064 *** 0.2028  ***
EDU=6  0.2189 *** 0.2129 *** 0.2271 *** 0.2238  ***
MM  0.0309 *** 0.0303 *** 0.0293 *** 0.0292  ***
MF  0.0213 *** 0.0195 *** 0.0196 *** 0.0192  ***
SM  0.0246 *** 0.0253 *** 0.0245 *** 0.0247  ***
1991 0.0071   0.0133   0.0033   0.0058   
1993 0.0263 *  0.0415 *** 0.0054   0.0127   
1995 0.0090   0.0152   -0.0096   -0.0053   
1998 0.0797 *** 0.0733 *** 0.0395 *** 0.0427  ***
2000 0.1089 *** 0.0867 *** 0.0518 *** 0.0525  ***
2002 0.0954 *** 0.0643 *** 0.0349 **  0.0335  ** 
2004 0.0817 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0171   0.0166   
2006 0.0637 *** 0.0392 **  0.0044   0.0057   
DIVORCE    0.0077 ***   0.0028  ***
FLFP     0.4379 *** 0.3673  ***
Adjusted R square  0.2146  0.2247 0.2322   0.2331 
Log  -17187.63  -16966.83  -16801.88      -16782.63       
Wald  4498.81  4247.54 4247.12 4262.73 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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In sum, these preliminary results confirm, as from previous studies, that female and single investors 
are less inclined to take risks. Moreover, they suggest that the structure of the Italian family and that 
of the Italian labor market do have an impact on financial participation decisions. However, there is 
no evidence, as of yet, that the impact of the latter factors falls more heavily on women rather than 
men, or single rather than married individuals. It follows that the explanation of the differential 
behavior of men vs. women, and married vs. single individuals, and their evolution over time, must 
be left to other factors. Risk attitudes have been suggested as a potential, exogenous determinant of 
such patterns.     
 
To further investigate whether the role of gender and marital status for portfolio decisions has 
evolved throughout the period under consideration, in connection with the evolution of family and 
society, we reestimate the above regressions including a set of interactions. Our final set of 
regressions are of the following form:  
 
( ) hkt hkt t kt kt t hkt hkt hkt hkt hkt MF A D SM MF MM X P ε τ β β β τ β β β β β + + + + + + + + = * 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1    (2) 
 
where the interactions between the time and the MF dummies aim at capturing how the behavior of 
married women has evolved with time, relative to the behavior of single women. Results are 
reported in Table 4. In column 1 we add the interactions involving time and MF to the basic 
specification of Table 3, column 1. The significance of the standard determinants of participation is 
confirmed. However, the new regressors reveal that the differential behavior of married women has 
significantly evolved over time. In particular, while the interactions involving the years 1998 and 
2000 are insignificant, the years immediately before and after are significantly negative, with the 
absolute value of each marginal effect increasing with the distance from the intermediate years. At 
the same time, the impact of MF almost doubles, while the other gender-status marginal effects are 
substantially unaltered. We interpret these results as follows. Consider first the intermediate years 
1998 and 2000: since the interaction terms in these two cases are not significant, it follows that for 
1998 and 2000 the marginal effect of MF fully captures the difference between married and single 
women. In other words, this evidence suggests that the difference between the decision of married 
and single women peaks in the central years of our sample. On the other hand, at the beginning of 
the sample, i.e., in 1995 and 1993, the interactions display negative marginal effects, which increase 
in absolute size and significance with the distance from the intermediate years. We can therefore 
conclude that, at the beginning of our sample, the difference between the decision of single and 
married women is small, then it tends to increase in 1993 and 1995, until it reaches its peak in 1998 
and 2000. Next, from 2002, the absolute value of the negative marginal effect of the interaction 
increases monotonically until 2006: this means that the difference between married and single 
women starts to decline. To sum up, the difference between married and single women displays an 
inverted-U shape: it tends to be lower at the beginning of the sample, peaks during the intermediate 




                                                 
9 To be noticed is that when the interactions are included the coefficient of MF becomes larger than that of MM: this is 
explained by the fact that the latter captures the average behavior over all waves, while the former applies only for those 
years where the interactions are insignificant.    17
Table 4. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006: time interactions. 
Variable 1  2  3  4 
AGE  0.0033 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0032 ***  0.0031  ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.0301 *** -0.0284 *** -0.0274 ***  -0.0272  ***
INCOME  0.0027 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0021 ***  0.0021  ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.0053 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0040 ***  -0.0039  ***
WEALTH  0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***  0.0001  ***
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.000005 *** -0.000005 ***  -0.000005 ***  -0.000005 *** 
FAMILY SIZE  -0.0172 *** -0.0136 *** -0.0129 ***  -0.0122  ***
CHILDREN  0.0051 *  0.0059 **  0.0065 ***  0.0065  ***
EDU=2  0.0630 *** 0.0502 *** 0.0457 ***  0.0441  ***
EDU=3  0.1108 *** 0.0921 *** 0.0897 ***  0.0866  ***
EDU=4  0.1711 *** 0.1503 *** 0.1486 ***  0.1449  ***
EDU=5  0.2152 *** 0.2006 *** 0.2062 ***  0.2025  ***
EDU=6  0.2191 *** 0.2133 *** 0.2275 ***  0.2242  ***
MM  0.0307 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0291 ***  0.0291  ***
MF  0.0450 *** 0.0412 **  0.0433 **  0.0427  ** 
SM  0.0244 *** 0.0251 *** 0.0244 ***  0.0245  ***
1991 0.0070   0.0132    0.0032    0.0057    
1993 0.0288 *  0.0445 *** 0.0075    0.0150    
1995 0.0099   0.0163    -0.0088    -0.0044    
1998 0.0781 *** 0.0719 *** 0.0385 ***  0.0416  ***
2000 0.1037 *** 0.0821 *** 0.0482 ***  0.0489  ***
2002 0.0958 *** 0.0648 *** 0.0355 **  0.0341  ***
2004 0.0841 *** 0.0520 *** 0.0187    0.0182    
2006 0.0659 *** 0.0408 **  0.0054    0.0067    
1991*MF 0.0152   0.0174    0.0161    0.0162    
1993*MF -0.0369 *** -0.0362 *** -0.0350 ***  -0.0350  ***
1995*MF -0.0234 **  -0.0228    -0.0228    -0.0228    
1998*MF 0.0035   0.0005    -0.0011    -0.0013    
2000*MF 0.0015   0.0034    0.0010    0.0011    
2002*MF -0.0164 **  -0.0150    -0.0163    -0.0162    
2004*MF -0.0220 *** -0.0196    -0.0205    -0.0202    
2006*MF -0.0228 *** -0.0201    -0.0190    -0.0189    
DIVORCE    0.0077 ***      0.0028  ***
FLFP          0.4368 ***  0.3662  ***
Adjusted R square  0.2153  0.2254  0.2329  0.2337 
Log  -17172.72    -16787.426     
Wald 4714.28  4513.16  4621.07  4598.66 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
But what is the explanation for this trend? Is it simply related to exogenous variations in risk 
attitudes? Or else by the evolution of gender roles in family and society? We believe that the latter 
explanation can account for at least a portion of the observed trend and we base our claim on the 
following further evidence. In particular, we argue that the the increased diffusion of divorce on the 
one hand, and the increased participation of women into the labor market on the other, can be the 
causes behind it. Therefore, in columns 2, 3, and 4, we add to our regressions the divorce rate and 
the female labor market participation rate, first individually and then jointly. Strikingly, the 
significance of the interactions involving time almost vanishes, with the only exception of the year   18
1993. At the same time the impact of all the other regressors is confirmed, even  though the 
marginal effect of MF is slightly lower and less significant, thus pointing to a reduced difference 
between the behavior of married and single women.
10 This suggests that indeed the evolution of 
family and society, through its negative impact on the perception of marriage as a  safe asset, 
explains a significant portion of the differential behavior of single and married women. In 
particular, the increase in labor participation is likely to have acted, at the initial stage, in the 
direction of widening the participation of married women to financial decision making. It is the 
lagged, cumulative impact of this force that presumably can explain why, at some point at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the difference between married and single women starts to emerge: before 
that time, the vast majority of female who were household financial heads were in fact single. As 
women, and particularly married women, had by that time entered the labor market, economic 
independence began to translate into financial independence. Later on, after the 1998-2000 peak is 
reached, another, new and opposing force comes into the picture. Gradually, the previous decade 
had in fact shaken the foundations of the Italian family, with an increase in the number of divorces 
which must have gradually eroded the perception of marriage as a safe asset, thus reducing the 
differential risk behavior of women with different marital status.  
 
To sum up, our results show that the financial participation decision of single women, relatively to 
other groups, far from being time invariant, evolves over time. Moreover, we identify factors that 
can explain its evolution. These factors are the evolution of the structure of family and society as 
reflected by decline of marriage as a valuable safe asset. 
 
The evolving role of family and society for financial decisions can further be confirmed through a 
set of repeated cross sections, one for each wave. These set of regressions is summarized in Table 5. 
The impact of household characteristics is confirmed, and so are the positive coefficients of MM 
and SM, while MF displays an unambiguously positive and significant coefficient only in 1998-
2002. The coefficients of the divorce rate and the female labor force participation rate retain their 
positive signs in most of the waves even though, especially for the former, the estimates are less 
precise than in the pooled case.  
 
The repeated cross section analysis allows, for the most recent waves of 2004 and 2006, further 
investigation regarding the role of a household head’s risk aversion. To evaluate the impact of risk 
aversion is important, since it could be the case that exogenous differences in risk aversion can fully 
explain the gender and marital status gap in making financial decisions. Therefore, for 2004 and 
2006, we rerun our cross section regressions adding the SHIW risk aversion measure. In both years, 
a higher risk aversion has a highly significant negative impact on the probability of holding risk 
assets. Moreover, in 2004 controlling for risk aversion lowers the significance of some standard 
characteristics such as age squared, income and income squared, and education. These differences, 
however, nearly disappear in 2006. These findings confirm that controlling for risk aversion allows 
a better understanding of the determinants of participation. However, turning to the gender-status 
dummies, we find that their impact is substantially retained: the marginal effect of MM remains 
highly significant, while its size is reduced in 2004, increased in 2006. The effect of SM is also very 
robust to the inclusion of risk aversion. The coefficient of MF loses significance in 2004, while 
remains insignificant in 2006. Overall, for the three dummies, including risk aversion makes the 
size of the coefficients larger in 2004, smaller in 2006. The impact of divorce and female labor 
participation is substantially unaltered. To conclude, including risk aversion does not modify the 
conclusions previously outlined.  
 
                                                 
10As an alternative to the female labor force  participation rate, we run our regressions including the female employment  
rate. We also run regressions where the separation rate replaces the  divorce rate. All our previous results hold under  
both alternative specifications.   19
Table 5. Summary of cross-section regressions, 1989-2006 
  1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002  2004  2006 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.006  AGE 
(0.512) (0.323) (0.109) (0.010) (0.084) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.006 0.003 -0.006 -0.016 -0.035 -0.042 -0.034 -0.042  -0.083  -0.054 -0.048 AGE
2 /1000 
(0.611) (0.439) (0.095) (0.003) (0.058) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000)
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001  INCOMECURR  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 INCOMECURR
 2 
/1000  (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  WEALTHCURR 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  WEALTHCURR
 2 
/1000  (0.000) (0.000) (0.465) (0.003) (0.004) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011 -0.023 -0.016 -0.020 -0.012 -0.037 -0.009 -0.005 FAMILY SIZE 
(0.017) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.120) (0.007) (0.228) (0.156) (0.258) (0.534)
0.010 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.036  -0.001 -0.003
CHILDREN 
(0.018) (0.345) (0.001) (0.015) (0.467) (0.876) (0.160) (0.527) (0.206) (0.915) (0.780)
0.011 0.012 0.848 0.036 0.057 0.107 0.042 0.029 0.097 0.025 0.021  EDU=2 
(0.429) (0.275) (0.000) (0.067) (0.061) (0.024) (0.072) (0.351) (0.330) (0.404) (0.454)
0.031 0.023 0.940 0.055 0.099 0.165 0.100 0.087 0.200 0.068 0.056  EDU=3 
(0.080) (0.102) (0.000) (0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.033) (0.008) (0.023)
0.071 0.046 0.982 0.094 0.145 0.230 0.166 0.163 0.292 0.124 0.102  EDU=4 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
0.104 0.047 0.995 0.136 0.205 0.314 0.201 0.240 0.359 0.169 0.132  EDU=5 
(0.004) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.122 0.055 0.991 0.138 0.427 0.183 0.455 0.270 0.414 0.041 0.020  EDU=6 
(0.015) (0.087) (0.000) (0.048) (0.003) (0.119) (0.000) (0.003) (0.022) (0.473) (0.671)
0.008 0.005 0.008 0.018 0.033 0.044 0.050 0.058 0.134 0.032 0.025  MM 
(0.029) (0.356) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
0.016 0.021 -0.003 0.005 0.044 0.056 0.028 0.031 0.057 0.009 0.006 
MF 
(0.146) (0.207) (0.009) (0.681) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) (0.156) (0.460) (0.615)
0.014 -0.004 0.011 0.030 0.015 0.042 0.024 0.033 0.080 0.032 0.025  SM 
(0.027) (0.669) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.053) (0.005) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000)
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.003  DIVORCE 
(0.096) (0.577) (0.429) (0.059) (0.653) (0.357) (0.070) (0.023) (0.012) (0.552) (0.578)
0.142 0.113 0.065 0.211 0.519 0.569 0.463 0.641 0.930 0.616 0.595 
FLFP 
(0.071) (0.144) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
          -0.183    -0.064 RISK 
AVERSION            (0.000)  (0.000)
Observations 8274  8188  8089  8135  7147  8001 8011  8012  2808  7768  7768 
Adjusted R
2  0.2814  0.2340  0.2538  0.2467 0.2082 0.1989 0.2341 0.2119  0.1479  0.2038 0.2262
Log-likelihood -1032.6  -1142.9 -1422.1 -1386.6 -2040.5 -2614.4 -2335.0 -2330.2 -1542.3 -2178.7 -2117.6
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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6. Robustness 
 
In this section we summarize results from a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions, to 
investigate their robustness. All tables are relegated to the Robustness Appendix. Overall, the 
results presented below provide additional insights but do not alter our general conclusions. 
 
a) An alternative definition of risky assets 
 
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) first investigate the determinants of the participation decision over SHIW 
data for the 1989-1995 period. However, as discussed in the Data Section, they employ a different 
definition of risky assets, including a larger set of financial instruments. We rerun our regressions 
under the Guiso and Jappelli’s (2002) definition for the dependent variable. Results without and 
with time interactions are presented in Table A.1. While our findings concerning standard 
determinants and the divorce and activity rates are confirmed, MF remains significant only in the 
basic regressions without time interactions. Both the dummy and its interactions with time lose 
significance when entered together. Notice, however, that Guiso and Jappelli (2002) limit their 
investigation to the 1989-1995 period, and do acknowledge themselves that the meaning of their 
asset classification is likely to have changed in most recent years. 
 
b) Wealth quantile regressions   
  
To investigate how our results vary across wealth quantiles, we run quantile regressions for five 
different classes, namely one for each quartile (I, II, III, and IV quartiles) as well as for the top 5% 
(see Table A.2).
11 We find that MM is always highly significant, while SM is not significant for the 
extreme classes. Similarly, without time interactions MF is significant only for the middle quantiles, 
while for all classes except the second there is evidence of time variability. However, the 
significance of the time interactions is not affected by the inclusion of  the divorce rate and the 
female labor force participation rate. Interestingly, the divorce rate is not significantly affecting the 
decision of households belonging to the two lowest classes. 
 
 
c) Family structure  
 
While our previous results are based on a distinction between married and single houselhold heads, 
it is possible to investigate the effect of a finer definition of marital status. To this end, we separate 
singles among separated/divorced, widowed, and never married, by introducing an appropriate set 
of redefined dummy variables. In Table A.3 we show that, in a specifications including time 
interactions, widowed and separated/divorced women tend to behave like never married ones, while 
married women retain a higher propensity to participate if compared with never married ones, even 
if the precision of the estimates declines. Interestingly, however, separated/divorced men tend to 
behave more like married men than never married. Similar results emerge in a specification without 
time interactions, which we omit for brevity. Moreover, the time variability of the MF dummy is 
absent and unaffected by the inclusion of divorce and female labor force participation. This 
suggests that, for women, a distinction among the causes of non marriage does not make a 
difference for their financial choices: all unmarried women appear to behave similarly, 
independently of the circumstances that led them to this status.  
 
                                                 
11 Over the pooled sample, the first quartile is about 17.500€, the median 86.000€, the upper 182.400€ while the richest 
5% households have a net wealth higher than 517.000€.   
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d) Divorce vs. work 
 
While our analysis has so far highlighted the role of two factors – the divorce rate and the female 
labor force participation rate - in shaping the investment behavior of female household heads, it 
should be noticed that the rise in female labor force participation has sometimes been mentioned in 
the literature as an alternative explanation for the evolution of women’s decisions, if compared with 
the rise of divorce. For example, Edlund and Pande (2002) test the hypothesis that womes’ 
mobilization into the labor force may obscure the effect of divorce on the political gender gap, but 
find that the effect of divorce remains robust to the inclusion of labor force participation variables. 
Our results from Tables 3 and 4 show that these two variables are equally relevant in our 
regressions. In the attempt to disentangle their impact, we take a first step by running our set of 
regressions over  a subsample of employed household heads (see Table A.4, where we presents a 
specification with time interactions, since results without interactions are very similar). The 
marginal effect of age, for this subsample, becomes larger, while no relevant difference emerges for 
the other standard determinants of the investment decision. The marginal effects of MM and SM are 
now larger, while there is no significant difference between the behavior of married and single 
females. Likewise, there is no significant evidence of an evolution of such difference. These results 
suggest that, as long as a woman is employed, her perception of the risk associated with the rise of 
divorce tends to fade away. Following the lead of Edlund and Pande (2002), we also run an 
alternative set of regressions, over the full sample, where we introduce as an additional control a 
dummy that captures the fact that the houselhold head is employed (see Table A.5, again for a 
specification with time interactions). The marginal effect of the dummy is negative, which can be 
explained by the fact that bearing undiversifiable labor risks can riduce the propensity to partecipate 
in risky financial assets. Once we control for this factor, however, the marginal effect of MF 
remains highly significant, even if its size is somewhat smaller. If compared to our main regressions 
in Table 4, what is lost is the time variability of MF, since most of the time interactions are 
insignificant. These results are confirmed even taking into account an interaction between MF and 
the employment dummy, and are in line with those obtained over the subsample of employed 
household heads. To sum up, we can conclude that both divorce and female employment are 





Based on a dataset drawn from the 1989-2006 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth, we have studied to joint impact of gender and marital status on financial decisions, its time 
evolution, and the determinants of this evolution. Controlling for a number of observable 
characteristics, we have shown that single women have a lower propensity to invest in risky assets 
than married females and males. These findings confirms our hypothesis that marriage may work as 
a sort of safe asset when women make portfolio decisions.  Moreover, we have presented empirical 
evidence showing that the differential behavior of single women has evolved over time, and that 
this evolution, rather than being determined by exogenous variations in risk attitudes, can be related 
to the increased incidence of divorce and the expansion of female labor market participation. Our 
results therefore suggest that women’s perception of marriage as a safe asset, as reflected by their 
portfolio choices, has been shaped by the transformation of the structure of family and society.  
 
More generally, our investigation leads us to conclude the evolution of gender roles will continue to 
affect household financial decisions as well as macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, beside the 
increased incidence of divorce we have focused on, we have also witnessed a fall of formal   
marriages and a parallel increase of cohabitations, some of which have represented a preliminary 
step on the path to marriage. At the same, among marriages, we have observed a huge increase of 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
VARIABLE  Description   
SHIW DATA 
Source: http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait  
PARTICIPATION  Binary variable assuming value 1 in case of risky assets holdings in financial 
portfolios, 0 otherwise.  
AGE  Integer variable assuming values between 16 and 114 
INCOMECURR  Continuous variable representing household income at current values in thousand € 
WEALTHCURR  Continuous variable representing household Net Wealth, defined as financial and 
real activities net of financial liabilities, at current values in thousand € 
INCOME  Continuous variable representing household income at 1995 value expressed in 
thousand €; obtained discounting Y by CPI with base 1995, as from Istat 
WEALTH  Continuous variable representing household Net Wealth at 1995 value expressed in 
thousand €; obtained discounting W by CPI with base 1995, as from Istat 
FAMILY SIZE  Number of household components ranging between 1 and 9 
CHILDREN  Number of children in the household (no age limit, children living in the household) 
ranging from 0 to 7 
EDU 
Categorical variable representing the highest education level achieved: 
 
1 = no education 
2 = primary school 
3 = secondary school 
4 = college 
5= graduate level 
6 = post-graduate level 
 
MALE  Binary variable assuming value 1 for male, 0 for female  
MARRIED  Binary variable assuming value 1 for married, 0 otherwise, i.e. for never married, 
widowed or separated/divorced 
RISKFIN 
Categorical variable representing the preferred risk profile of financial investments: 
 
1 = high risk, high returns 
2 = reasonable risk, good returns 
3 = low risk, reasonable returns  
4 = no risk, low returns  
 
RISKAVERSION   Binary variable set to 1 if RISKFIN = 4, 0 otherwise   
Istat DATA 
Source: http://www.istat.it/  
CPI  Consumer Price Index for whole collectivity    25
MARRIAGES   Number of celebrated marriages at the regional level. 
SEPARATIONS   Number of separations passed with sentence or validated without sentence  during 
the year at the regional level. 
DIVORCES   Number of divorces approved during the year at the regional level. 
POPULATION  Total resident population at the regional level, in thousands  
DIVORCE  Crude divorce rate at the regional level, computed as the number of divorces in 
each region every 1000 region residents. Ranging between 1% and 14% 
SEPARATION  Crude separation rate at the regional level, computed as the number of separations 
in each region every 1000 region residents. Ranging between 2% and 24%  
FLFP 
Female lavor force participation rate at the regional level, computed as the ratio of 
women occupied and those actively looking for an occupation over total female 
working-age population in the region. Ranging from 22% to 47% 
FER 
Female employment rate at the regional level, computed as the ratio of women 
employed over total female working-age population in the region. Ranging between 
13% and 44% 
OECD DATA 




Female population between 15 and 64 years of age, in thousands, available since 
1956 
FEMALE 
EMPLOYMENT   Employed women in thousands, available since 1958 
FER    Female employment rate, computed as the ratio of employed women over female 
working-age population 
 




Table A1. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
An alternative definition of risky assets 
No time interactions Time interactions   Variable 
1  1 2 3  4 
AGE 0.010  ***  0.010*** 0.011 *** 0.011 ***  0.011 ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.112 ***  -0.112*** -0.115 *** -0.117 ***  -0.117 ***
INCOME 0.013  ***  0.013*** 0.010 *** 0.009 ***  0.009 ***
INCOME
2/1000 -0.026  ***  -0.026*** -0.021 *** -0.018 ***  -0.018 ***
WEALTH  0.0004  ***  0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***  0.0004 ***
WEALTH
2/1000 -0.00003  ***  -0.00003 *** -0.00003 *** -0.00003 ***  -0.00003 ***
FAMILY SIZE  -0.049 ***  -0.048*** -0.027 *** -0.025 ***  -0.021 ***
CHILDREN -0.002    -0.003   0.001   0.007    0.007  
EDU=2 0.142  ***  0.142*** 0.098 *** 0.091 ***  0.084 ***
EDU=3 0.211  ***  0.211*** 0.163 *** 0.170 ***  0.159 ***
EDU=4 0.263  ***  0.263*** 0.225 *** 0.237 ***  0.228 ***
EDU=5 0.226  ***  0.226*** 0.218 *** 0.246 ***  0.240 ***
EDU=6 0.271  ***  0.271*** 0.281 *** 0.325 ***  0.320 ***
MM 0.067  ***  0.067*** 0.073 *** 0.074 ***  0.075 ***
MF 0.044  ***  0.045   0.049   0.063    0.062  
SM 0.036  ***  0.036*** 0.043 *** 0.043 ***  0.044 ***
1991  0.055   0.056   0.085 *** 0.038    0.051 ** 
1993  0.140 ***  0.142*** 0.205 *** 0.048  *  0.087 ***
1995  0.240 ***  0.241*** 0.276 *** 0.145 ***  0.174 ***
1998  0.224 ***  0.219*** 0.202 *** 0.100 ***  0.114 ***
2000  0.200 ***  0.195*** 0.136 *** 0.044    0.047  
2002  0.136 **  0.138*** 0.039   -0.040    -0.045 * 
2004  0.163 ***  0.164*** 0.055   -0.052  *  -0.055 ** 
2006  0.061   0.063   -0.036   -0.145 ***  -0.142 ***
1991*MF      -0.124   -0.127   -0.134    -0.133  
1993*MF      -0.038   -0.055   -0.062    -0.064  
1995*MF     -0.007   -0.030   -0.035    -0.039  
1998*MF     0.080   0.073   0.062    0.062  
2000*MF     0.033   0.028   0.018    0.019  
2002*MF     -0.009   -0.015   -0.032    -0.031  
2004*MF     -0.011   -0.004   -0.020    -0.016  
2006*MF     -0.019   -0.017   -0.008    -0.010  
DIVORCE         0.046 ***     0.017 ***
FLFP             2.506 ***  2.062 ***
Adjusted  0.1853  0.1856 0.2132 0.2297  0.2321
Wald   4438.89  4605.01 4221.16 5564.34  5406.51
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level. The dependent binary variable is 1 if the household holds risky assets 
whereby this class is defined as in Guiso and Jappelli (2002). For the model without time-
interactions, we report just the baseline model  (column numbered 1 as in previous tables), 
while for model with time interactions we report all the specifications (columns numbered 
from 1 to 4 as in previous tables).* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.   27
 
Table A2. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
Wealth quantile regressions 
I QUANTILE  II QUANTILE  
No Time Interactions  Time-Interactions  No Time Interactions  Time-Interactions  Variable 
1 4 1 4 1  4  1 4 
AGE  0.0002 **  0.0002 **  0.0002 **  0.0002 **  -0.0002     0.0001    -0.0002    -0.0001   
AGE
2 /1000  -0.002  *  -0.002  *  -0.002 *  -0.002 *  -0.0004    -0.001    -0.0005    -0.001   
INCOME  0.001  ***  0.0004  ***  0.0006 *** 0.0004 *** 0.004 ***  0.003 ***  0.004 *** 0.003 ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.006  ***  -0.004  **  -0.006 **  -0.004 **  -0.038 ***  -0.029 ***  -0.038 *** -0.029 ***
WEALTH  0.0004 *** 0.0003 ***  0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** -0.0007 ** 0.0005  *  -0.0007 **  0.0005 * 
WEALTH
2/1000  0.002  ***  0.002  ***  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.005 *  0.004    0.005 *  0.004   
FAMILY SIZE  -0.003  ***  -0.002  ***  -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.021 ***  -0.017 ***  -0.021 *** -0.017 ***
CHILDREN  0.002  **  0.002  **  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.016 ***  0.015 ***  0.016 *** 0.015 ***
EDU=2  0.006     0.005     0.006    0.005    0.014 **  0.008    0.014 **  0.007   
EDU=3  0.014  ***  0.012  **  0.014 *** 0.012 **  0.035 ***  0.026 ***  0.034 *** 0.026 ***
EDU=4  0.025  ***  0.022  ***  0.024 *** 0.022 *** 0.063 ***  0.053 ***  0.062 *** 0.052 ***
EDU=5  0.021  **  0.020  **  0.021 **  0.020 **  0.102 ***  0.094 ***  0.101 *** 0.094 ***
EDU=6  0.038     0.049  *  0.037    0.048 *  0.095    0.094    0.094    0.093   
MM  0.002  **  0.002  **  0.002 **  0.002 **  0.013 ***  0.013 ***  0.013 *** 0.013 ***
MF 0.00004    0.00002   -0.006 *** -0.005 *** 0.005   0.006   0.021   0.028  
SM  0.001     0.001     0.001    0.001    0.012 ***  0.013 ***  0.012 *** 0.013 ***
1991  -0.0003     -0.001     -0.0003    0.0005    0.006    0.004    0.006    0.004   
1993  -0.0005     -0.001     -0.0004    -0.001    0.024 **  0.015    0.026 **  0.017 * 
1995  -0.0006     -0.001     -0.001    -0.002    0.025 *  0.012    0.022 *  0.010   
1998  0.003  **  0.001     0.004 **  0.001    0.050 ***  0.031 ***  0.050 *** 0.031 ***
2000  0.013  ***  0.006  ***  0.013 *** 0.006 *** 0.077 ***  0.045 ***  0.073 *** 0.043 ***
2002  0.010  ***  0.004  **  0.011 *** 0.004 *** 0.050 ***  0.022 **  0.049 *** 0.021 ** 
2004  0.007  ***  0.001     0.007 *** 0.001    0.062 ***  0.024 **  0.064 *** 0.025 ** 
2006  0.009  ***  0.002     0.008 *** 0.001    0.056 ***  0.019 *  0.061 *** 0.021 * 
1991*MF              /    /               0.011    0.006   
1993*MF              /    /               -0.020    -0.019 * 
1995*MF              0.971 *** 0.968 ***            0.009    0.002   
1998*MF              /    /               -0.010    -0.012   
2000*MF              0.894 *** 0.885 ***            -0.002    -0.005   
2002*MF              0.759    0.739               -0.005    -0.008   
2004*MF              0.890 *** 0.889 ***            -0.012    -0.013   
2006*MF              0.944 *** 0.942 ***            -0.018    -0.017   
DIVORCE        -         -0.0001          0.0010         0.001   
FLFP        0.0300  ***       0.030 ***       0.1630 ***       0.162 ***
Adjusted R
2   0.1977  0.2114  0.1993 0.2132 0.1747 0.1894 0.1768 0.1915
OBS  17915 17915 17664 17664 17898 17898  17898  17898
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. The models 
are estimated over different wealth quantile. For each quantile, we report just the baseline model (column 
numbered 1 as in previous tables) and the one with divorce rate and female labour force participation both with 
and without time-interactions (column numbered 4 as in previous tables) . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.    28
Table A2. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
Wealth quantile regressions (ctd.) 
III QUANTILE  IV QUANTILE 
No Time Interactions  Time-Interactions  No Time Interactions  Time-Interactions  Variable 
1 4 1 4  1  4  1  4 
AGE  0.002 **  0.002 ***  0.002 **  0.002 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ***  0.007 *** 0.006 ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.063 *** -0.056 ***  -0.063 *** -0.057 ***
INCOME  0.007 ***  0.006 ***  0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***  0.004 *** 0.004 ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.062 *** -0.047 *** -0.062 *** -0.048 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 ***  -0.007 *** -0.006 ***
WEALTH  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.00007 *** 0.00003  ***  0.0001 *** 0.00006 ***
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.007 *** -0.006 **  -0.007 *** -0.006 **  -0.00001 *** -0.000003  ***  -0.0006 *** -0.000006 ***
FAMILY SIZE  -0.038 *** -0.031 *** -0.038 *** -0.030 *** -0.033 *** -0.025 ***  -0.033 *** -0.025 ***
CHILDREN  0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.005   0.010   0.005   0.010  
EDU=2  0.029 *  0.020   0.029 *  0.020   0.238 *** 0.214 ***  0.236 *** 0.213 ***
EDU=3  0.055 ***  0.046 ***  0.055 *** 0.046 *** 0.316 *** 0.293 ***  0.315 *** 0.292 ***
EDU=4  0.085 ***  0.082 ***  0.086 *** 0.082 *** 0.367 *** 0.352 ***  0.366 *** 0.351 ***
EDU=5  0.089 ***  0.100 ***  0.089 *** 0.100 *** 0.421 *** 0.433 ***  0.420 *** 0.433 ***
EDU=6  0.090 *  0.116 **  0.090 *  0.115 **  0.440 *** 0.467 ***  0.441 *** 0.467 ***
MM  0.034 ***  0.032 ***  0.034 *** 0.032 *** 0.076 *** 0.072 ***  0.076 *** 0.072 ***
MF  0.030 ***  0.028 *** -0.129 *** -0.122 *** 0.040 *** 0.032 **  0.151 **  0.134 ** 
SM  0.024 ***  0.025 ***  0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.063 *** 0.062 ***  0.063 *** 0.062 ***
1991 -0.012    -0.011   -0.013   -0.012   0.031   0.028   0.033   0.029  
1993 0.011    -0.001   0.012   0.001   0.059   0.033   0.065 *  0.039  
1995 -0.013    -0.021   -0.010   -0.019   -0.006   -0.038   -0.002   -0.034  
1998 0.074  ***  0.041 **  0.071 *** 0.039 **  0.176 *** 0.102 ***  0.174 *** 0.101 ***
2000 0.101  ***  0.052 ***  0.094 *** 0.047 **  0.217 *** 0.110 ***  0.208 *** 0.103 ***
2002 0.082  ***  0.029   0.083 *** 0.029   0.212 *** 0.087 **  0.213 *** 0.089 ** 
2004 0.063  **  0.010   0.066 *** 0.011   0.158 *** 0.026   0.165 *** 0.032  
2006 0.028    -0.014   0.028   -0.014   0.127 *** 0.005   0.134 *** 0.009  
1991*MF         0.940 *** 0.944          -0.054   -0.046  
1993*MF         0.943   0.947 ***        -0.125 **  -0.123 ** 
1995*MF        /    /          -0.103 **  -0.100 ** 
1998*MF        0.944 *** 0.947 ***        -0.037   -0.033  
2000*MF        0.950 *** 0.953 ***        -0.024   -0.024  
2002*MF        0.950 *** 0.953 ***        -0.075   -0.074  
2004*MF        0.950 *** 0.953 ***        -0.095 *  -0.091 ** 
2006*MF        0.949 *** 0.951 ***        -0.098 **  -0.085 * 
DIVORCE      0.003  **     0.003 **      0.010 ***     0.010  ***
FLFP      0.379  ***     0.379 ***     0.925 ***     0.922  ***
Adjusted R
2   0.1259  0.1419 0.1262  0.1422 0.1264 0.1448  0.1272 0.1456
OBS  17906  17906  17821  17821    17906  17906  17906  17906 
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. The models 
are estimated over different wealth quantile. For each quantile, we report just the baseline model (column 
numbered 1 as in previous tables) and the one with divorce rate and female labour force participation both with 
and without time-interactions (column numbered 4 as in previous tables) . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
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Table A2. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
Wealth quantile regressions (ctd.) 
Top 5% 
No Time Interactions  Time-Interactions  Variable 
1 4  1  4 
AGE  0.006   0.005   0.006   0.005  
AGE
2 /1000  -0.053   -0.040   -0.052   -0.039  
INCOME  0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***  0.004 *** 
INCOME
2/1000 -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.006 ***  -0.005 *** 
WEALTH  0.00003   0.00003   0.00003   0.00003  
WEALTH
2/1000 -0.000003   -0.000003   -0.000003   -0.000003  
FAMILY SIZE -0.020   -0.017   -0.020   -0.017  
CHILDREN  -0.006   0.003   -0.007   0.003  
EDU=2  0.233 *  0.176   0.232 *  0.175  
EDU=3  0.356 *** 0.301 **  0.354 **  0.299 ** 
EDU=4  0.415 *** 0.372 *** 0.414 ***  0.370 *** 
EDU=5  0.431 *** 0.404 *** 0.430 ***  0.403 *** 
EDU=6  0.429 *** 0.409 *** 0.428 ***  0.408 *** 
MM  0.101 *** 0.101 *** 0.101 ***  0.101 *** 
MF  -0.004   0.003   -0.492 ***  -0.490 *** 
SM  0.020   0.025   0.020   0.025  
1991 0.107  *  0.099 *  0.105   0.097 * 
1993 0.109  *  0.083   0.104 *  0.077  
1995 0.009    -0.035   0.011   -0.034  
1998 0.193  *** 0.116 *  0.188 ***  0.110 * 
2000 0.159  *** 0.041   0.148 ***  0.033  
2002 0.228  *** 0.091   0.223 ***  0.086  
2004 0.167  *** 0.017   0.170 ***  0.020  
2006 0.170  *** 0.024   0.165 ***  0.016  
1991*MF         /  /   
1993*MF         0.683   0.686  
1995*MF         0.704 ***  0.707 *** 
1998*MF         0.682 ***  0.685 *** 
2000*MF         0.695 ***  0.698 *** 
2002*MF         0.697 ***  0.701 *** 
2004*MF         0.701 ***  0.705 *** 
2006*MF         0.705 ***  0.709 *** 
DIVORCE    0.016  ***   0.016  *** 
FLFP     1.018  ***   1.025  *** 
Adjusted R
2 0.1070  0.1215 0.1077 0.1221 
OBS  3582 3582  3581  3581 
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level. The models are estimated over the 5% 
richest households. We report just the baseline model (comumn numbered 1 
as in previous tables) and the one with divorce rate and female labour force 
participation both with and without time-interactions (column numbered 4 
as in previous tables). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
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Table A3. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
A finer definition of marital status 
No Working dummy Working dummy 
Variable 
1  2 3 4  1  2 3 4 
AGE  0.003 ***  0.003 ***  0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***  0.003 *** 0.003 ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.032 ***  -0.030 ***  -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.033 *** -0.032 ***  -0.031 *** -0.031 ***
INCOME  0.003 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***  0.002 *** 0.002 ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.005 ***  -0.004 ***  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***  -0.004 *** -0.004 ***
WEALTH  0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 *** 0.00006 ***
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001  *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001  *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 ***
FAMILY SIZE  -0.018 ***  -0.014 ***  -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.018 *** -0.015 ***  -0.014 *** -0.013 ***
CHILDREN  0.006  ** 0.006  ** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ** 0.007  ***  0.008 *** 0.008 ***
EDU=2  0.063 ***  0.050 ***  0.046 *** 0.044 *** 0.062 *** 0.049 ***  0.045 *** 0.043 ***
EDU=3  0.110 ***  0.092 ***  0.090 *** 0.087 *** 0.110 *** 0.092 ***  0.089 *** 0.086 ***
EDU=4  0.171 ***  0.150 ***  0.148 *** 0.145 *** 0.171 *** 0.151 ***  0.149 *** 0.145 ***
EDU=5  0.214 ***  0.200 ***  0.206 *** 0.202 *** 0.217 *** 0.202 ***  0.208 *** 0.204 ***
EDU=6  0.218 ***  0.212 ***  0.226 *** 0.223 *** 0.220 *** 0.214 ***  0.228 *** 0.225 ***
MM   0.028 ***  0.026 ***  0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.028 *** 0.026 ***  0.026 *** 0.025 ***
WM  0.002   0.001   0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002   0.003  0.003  
DM  0.028 ***  0.030 ***  0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.029 ***  0.026 *** 0.027 ***
SM  0.023 ***  0.022 ***  0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** 0.022 ***  0.022 *** 0.022 ***
MF  0.036  * 0.034  * 0.037 * 0.036 * 0.037 * 0.034  * 0.037 * 0.036 * 
WF  -0.004   -0.009   -0.008  -0.009  -0.004  -0.008   -0.008  -0.009  
DF  -0.005   -0.006   -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  -0.007   -0.006  -0.006  
1991  0.007   0.013   0.003  0.006  0.007  0.013   0.003  0.006  
1993  0.029 *  0.045 ***  0.008   0.015   0.028 *  0.044 ***  0.007   0.015  
1995  0.010    0.017   -0.009  -0.004   0.010   0.016   -0.009  -0.005  
1998  0.078 ***  0.072 ***  0.039 *** 0.042 *** 0.077 *** 0.071 ***  0.038 *** 0.041 ***
2000  0.104 ***  0.082 ***  0.048 *** 0.049 *** 0.103 *** 0.081 ***  0.047 *** 0.048 ***
2002  0.096 ***  0.065 ***  0.036 **  0.034 *** 0.095 *** 0.064 ***  0.035 **  0.034 ***
2004  0.084 ***  0.052 ***  0.019   0.019   0.084 *** 0.052 ***  0.019   0.018  
2006  0.066 ***  0.041 **  0.006   0.007   0.066 *** 0.041 **  0.005   0.007  
1991*MF  0.018   0.017   0.016  0.016  0.018  0.018   0.016  0.016  
1993*MF  -0.036 ***  -0.036 ***  -0.035 *** -0.035 *** -0.037 *** -0.037 ***  -0.036 *** -0.036 ***
1995*MF  -0.021   -0.023   -0.023  -0.023  -0.023  -0.024   -0.024 *  -0.024 * 
1998*MF 0.003    0.000   -0.001  -0.002   0.002  -0.001   -0.003  -0.003  
2000*MF  0.005   0.003   0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001    -0.001   -0.001  
2002*MF  -0.014   -0.015   -0.016  -0.016  -0.015  -0.016   -0.018  -0.018  
2004*MF  -0.020   -0.020   -0.021 *  -0.020  -0.021  -0.021   -0.022 *  -0.021 * 
2006*MF  -0.021   -0.020   -0.019  -0.019  -0.022  -0.021   -0.020  -0.020  
WORKING           -0.009 *** -0.009  ***  -0.008 *** -0.008 ***
DIVORCE     0.008 ***  0.437 *** 0.003 ***    0.008 ***     0.003 ***
FLFP         0.365 ***      0.437 *** 0.365 ***
Adjusted R  0.2155 0.2257 0.2331 0.2341 0.2159 0.2261 0.2335          0.2344 
Log  -17166.97      -16944.55  -16781.1  -16761.3       -17158.911    -16936.38     -16772.93     -16753.14    
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the regional level and time-
interaction dummies. MM stands for married male, WM for Widow Male, DM for Divorced/Separated Male and 
SM for Single (never married) male. Analogous definitions hold for Female. The right panel reports results 
obtained including also a dummy for actually participation to the labour market.  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.    31
Table A4. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
Employed household heads subsample 
Variable 1  2  3  4 
AGE 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.007  *** 
AGE
2 /1000  -0.083 *** -0.073 *** -0.065 *** -0.064  *** 
INCOME 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002  *** 
INCOME
2/1000 -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.004  *** 
WEALTH    0.00008  ***  0.00008  ***  0.00008  ***   0.00008  *** 
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** -0.00001  *** 
FAMILY SIZE  -0.022 *** -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.016  *** 
CHILDREN 0.008 *  0.009 **  0.009 **  0.009  ** 
EDU=2 0.059 **  0.057 *  0.045   0.045   
EDU=3 0.102 *** 0.096 *** 0.089 *** 0.087  *** 
EDU=4 0.164 *** 0.160 *** 0.152 *** 0.151  *** 
EDU=5 0.224 *** 0.230 *** 0.225 *** 0.224  *** 
EDU=6 0.225 *** 0.248 *** 0.261 *** 0.261  *** 
MM 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.037  *** 
MF 0.041   0.042   0.047   0.046   
SM 0.025 *** 0.027 *** 0.028 *** 0.028  *** 
1991 0.007   0.015   0.003   0.006   
1993 0.039 *  0.058 *** 0.012   0.021   
1995 0.008   0.015   -0.015   -0.010   
1998 0.087 *** 0.080 *** 0.043 **  0.046  *** 
2000 0.121 *** 0.097 *** 0.058 *** 0.059  *** 
2002 0.109 *** 0.075 *** 0.040 **  0.039  ** 
2004 0.079 *** 0.045 **  0.008   0.008   
2006 0.066 **  0.038 *  -0.003   -0.001   
1991*MF 0.047   0.047   0.047   0.047   
1993*MF -0.050 **  -0.051 **  -0.050 **  -0.050  ** 
1995*MF -0.030   -0.031   -0.032   -0.032   
1998*MF 0.035   0.027   0.023   0.022   
2000*MF 0.018   0.012   0.008   0.008   
2002*MF -0.009   -0.013   -0.016   -0.016   
2004*MF -0.005   -0.008   -0.009   -0.009   
2006*MF -0.009   -0.009   -0.012   -0.012   
DIVORCE     0.010 ***   0.003  *** 
FLFP         0.569 *** 0.489  *** 
Observations 36770  36770  36770  36770 
Adjusted R square  0.1841  0.1937  0.2018  0.2025 
Log  -10412.63 -10290.84 -10187.46  -10178.85 
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered 
at the regional level and time-interaction dummies, estimated on the subsample 
of actually employed households. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
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Table A5. The determinants of the participation decision, 1989-2006:  
Whole sample, additional dummy for employed household head 
Working  Working Married Female   Variable 
1 2 3 4 1  2  3  4 
AGE  0.003 ***  0.003 ***  0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***  0.003 *** 0.003 ***
AGE
2 /1000  -0.032 ***  -0.030 ***  -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.033 *** -0.031 ***  -0.030 *** -0.029 ***
INCOME  0.003 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***  0.002 *** 0.002 ***
INCOME
2/1000  -0.005 ***  -0.005 ***  -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***  -0.004 *** -0.004 ***
WEALTH  0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***  0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***  0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***
WEALTH
2/1000  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001 ***  -0.00001 ***  -0.00001 ***  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001  ***  -0.00001 ***
FAMILY SIZE  -0.018 ***  -0.014 ***  -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.018 *** -0.014 ***  -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
CHILDREN  0.006 **  0.007 **  0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 **  0.007  ***  0.007  *** 0.007 ***
EDU=2  0.062 ***  0.050 ***  0.045 *** 0.043 *** 0.062 *** 0.050 ***  0.045 *** 0.043 ***
EDU=3  0.111 ***  0.092 ***  0.089 *** 0.086 *** 0.110 *** 0.092 ***  0.089 *** 0.086 ***
EDU =4  0.172 ***  0.151 ***  0.149 *** 0.146 *** 0.171 *** 0.151 ***  0.149 *** 0.145 ***
EDU =5  0.218 ***  0.203 ***  0.208 *** 0.205 *** 0.217 *** 0.202 ***  0.208 *** 0.204 ***
EDU =6  0.222 ***  0.216 ***  0.230 *** 0.226 *** 0.222 *** 0.216 ***  0.230 *** 0.226 ***
MM  0.031 ***  0.031 ***  0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.032 *** 0.031 ***  0.030 *** 0.030 ***
MF  0.041 **  0.042 **  0.044 **  0.043 **  0.023   0.027    0.032  *  0.032  
SM  0.025 ***  0.026 ***  0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.026 ***  0.025 *** 0.025 ***
1991  0.007   0.013   0.003   0.006   0.007   0.013   0.003   0.006  
1993  0.028  *  0.044 ***  0.007   0.015   0.028 *  0.044 ***  0.007    0.015  
1995  0.009   0.016   -0.009   -0.005   0.009   0.016   -0.009   -0.005  
1998  0.077 ***  0.071 ***  0.038 *** 0.041 *** 0.077 *** 0.071 ***  0.038 *** 0.041 ***
2000  0.103 ***  0.081 ***  0.047 *** 0.048 *** 0.102 *** 0.081 ***  0.047 *** 0.048 ***
2002  0.095 ***  0.064 ***  0.035 **  0.034 *** 0.094 *** 0.064 ***  0.035  **  0.033 ***
2004  0.083 ***  0.051 ***  0.018   0.018   0.083 *** 0.051 ***  0.018    0.018  
2006  0.065  ***  0.040 **  0.005   0.006   0.065 *** 0.040 **  0.005    0.006  
1991*MF  0.019   0.018   0.016   0.017   0.019   0.018   0.016   0.017  
1993*MF  -0.037 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.036 *** -0.036 *** -0.035 *** -0.036 ***  -0.035 *** -0.035 ***
1995*MF  -0.023   -0.024   -0.024 *  -0.024 * -0.019   -0.022   -0.022   -0.022  
1998*MF  0.002   -0.001   -0.003   -0.003   0.006   0.002   0.000   -0.001  
2000*MF  0.003   0.001   -0.001   -0.001   0.009   0.006   0.002   0.002  
2002*MF  -0.015   -0.016   -0.018   -0.017   -0.011   -0.013   -0.015   -0.015  
2004*MF  -0.021   -0.021   -0.022 *  -0.021 * -0.017   -0.018   -0.020   -0.019  
2006*MF  -0.022   -0.021   -0.020   -0.020   -0.018   -0.019   -0.018   -0.018  
WORKING  -0.009 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.009 *** -0.009 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***  -0.010 *** -0.010 ***
WORKING*MF            0.018 *** 0.013  **  0.011  *  0.010 * 
DIVORCE     0.008  ***    0.003 ***   0.008  ***     0.003 ***
FLFP        0.437 *** 0.366 ***       0.436  *** 0.365 ***
Adjusted R  0.2156 0.2257 0.2333 0.2341 0.2333  0.2258  0.2333  0.2342 
Log  -17164.33 -16943.05 -16778.75 -16759.39 -16777.23  -16940.89  -16777.23  -16758.0 
Note: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the regional level and with 
time-interaction dummies. The right panel of the table reports the results obtained including also a dummy for 
being a working married female. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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